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Executive Summary 
 
An analysis of 2005 federal mortgage lending data shows that African American and Latino borrowers 
remain much more likely to pay more for their home purchase loans than white borrowers.   
 
This report examines the cost of borrowing in six metropolitan areas in the United States. These areas 
include large urban areas - New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston, - as well as the smaller 
urban areas of Charlotte, NC and Rochester, NY. This study confirms that large disparities remain in the 
pricing of home purchase loans. 
 
• In these six metropolitan areas, African American borrowers were 3.8 times more likely to receive 
a higher-cost home purchase loan than were white borrowers. 
 
• In the same six metro areas, Latino borrowers were 3.6 times more likely than white borrowers to 
receive a higher-cost home purchase loan.  
 
The study focuses on lending by Citigroup, Countrywide, GMAC, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Washington 
Mutual, and Wells Fargo. These lenders were analyzed because they are among the biggest financial 
institutions in the nation, and all originated a substantial volume of both higher-cost subprime and lower-
cost prime loans.   
 
• For these seven lenders, the percentage of total home purchase loans to African Americans that were 
higher-cost was 6 times greater than the percentage of higher cost home purchase loans to whites in 
the same cities, and for the same lenders in the six cities (41.1 percent vs. 6.9 percent). 
 
• The percentage of total home purchase loans to Latinos that were higher-cost was 4.8 times greater 
than the percentage of higher cost home purchase loans to whites (32.8 percent vs. 6.9 percent). 
 
• In each of the cities examined, the seven lenders combined showed larger African American/white 
and Latino/white disparities than those exhibited for the overall lending market. 
 
• The worst disparity for any individual lending group was observed in Chicago, where African 
American borrowers were 14 times more likely to receive a higher-cost home purchase loan from 
Wells Fargo than were white borrowers (35.3 percent vs. 2.5 percent).1 
 
The report also offers a case study of one lender – Washington Mutual (WaMu), to highlight the 
significant role that different lending channels play in home loan pricing. WaMu’s higher-cost subprime 
lender, Long Beach Mortgage Company, was WaMu’s main lender to African American and Latino 
borrowers in the six survey cities.  
 
• Regardless of race, 90 percent of Long Beach borrowers received higher-cost home purchase loans.  
 
• Long Beach Mortgage accounted for 75.9 percent of all WaMu home purchase loans to African 
Americans, and 64.7 percent of all WaMu home purchase loans to Latinos. 
 
• In contrast, WaMu’s lower-cost prime lender, Washington Mutual Bank, accounted for more than 80 
percent of all WaMu home purchase loans to whites.  
 
                                                 
1 Larger disparities were observed for lenders in other cities, but were omitted because of low loan volumes. 
i
• Less than 1 percent of the loans originated by Washington Mutual Bank were higher-cost loans. 
 
Which lending channel a borrower enters – prime or subprime – has a large impact on the price she will 
pay for her home loan. 
 
New York City was especially hard hit by these seven lenders.  African American borrowers were more 
than 12 times as likely to receive a higher-cost home purchase loan as were their white counterparts. 
Latino borrowers in New York were almost eight times more likely than white borrowers to receive a 
higher-cost home purchase loan. 
 
The report concludes with recommendations for the federal banking regulators, Wall Street, legislators, 
lenders, and the Federal Reserve to implement in order to end unfair and discriminatory lending. 
 
 
ii
 Paying More for the American Dream: A Multi-State Analysis of Higher Cost Home 
Purchase Lending 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Minority communities, fair lending advocates, and policy makers have for years been concerned about 
discrimination in lending and unequal access to credit. In the past, the concern was whether all borrowers 
were able to obtain loans, and analysis focused on the fact that loan applicants of color were more likely 
to be denied home loans. Today, with credit more widely available, the concern is whether certain groups 
pay more for their loans. Considerable research has demonstrated that African American and Latino 
borrowers and neighborhoods are much more likely to receive higher-cost mortgages than white 
borrowers and neighborhoods. The findings of this report confirm and extend the results of this previous 
research.   
 
This report demonstrates that African American and Latino borrowers are paying more than their white 
counterparts for home purchase loans in six geographic areas: Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Los Angeles, 
New York, and Rochester. This review of federal lending data shows dramatic disparities. For example, 
in New York, African American borrowers were five times more likely to receive higher-cost home 
purchase loans than were white borrowers.  
 
Homeownership remains the best path to building financial assets and attaining wealth for most 
Americans. With assets, families can more easily pay for a child’s education, start a small business, 
prepare for retirement, or help to build wealth and a brighter future for their children and grandchildren. 
 
Yet this vision is frustrated when borrowers are forced to pay too much for their home loans. Borrowers 
who obtain a home loan at an unnecessarily high interest rate will pay hundreds of dollars more each 
month in mortgage payments, making them more vulnerable to short term economic distress that may 
result from job loss or medical problems. In consequence, borrowers of color run higher risks of 
foreclosure, and will accumulate equity in their homes much more slowly than white borrowers. While 
for some minority borrowers with tarnished credit histories, higher-priced home loans provide the only 
access to the mortgage market and to homeownership, many other borrowers of color will be paying far 
more for their mortgages than their credit histories justify.  
 
The skyrocketing levels of foreclosures in urban areas, and minority communities in particular, have been 
tied to the growth of concentrated subprime lending in these areas.1 Concentrated foreclosures have a 
devastating impact on cities and neighborhoods. They affect local property values, serve as a magnet for 
crime, and hurt a city’s property tax base.2    
 
While many institutions specialize in lending to either prime or subprime markets, there is an important 
set of large lenders that are active in both markets. These lenders utilize diverse lending channels such as 
branch, broker and correspondent networks that allow them to reach a wide variety of geographic 
                                                 
1Immergluck, Dan and Geoff Smith. March 2004. “Risky Business: An Econometric Analysis of the Relationship Between Subprime 
Lending and Foreclosures.”  Woodstock Institute: Chicago, IL 
 
2For discussions of the external impacts of foreclosures see Immergluck, Dan and Geoff Smith. June 2005. There Goes the Neighborhood:  
The Effect of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values.  Woodstock Institute:  Chicago, IL; Immergluck, Dan and Geoff Smith. 
November 2006. “The Impact of Single Family Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime.” Housing Studies (21:6); and Apgar, William, Mark Duda, 
and Rochelle Nawrocki Gorey. February 2005. The Municipal Costs of Foreclosures: A Chicago Case Study. Foreclosure Prevention Foundation:  
Minneapolis, MN 
  
markets. Their size also gives them the capacity to offer an array of products that may be appropriate for 
customers with different levels of credit quality.   
 
This report examines the lending patterns of seven large mortgage lenders that operate substantial prime 
and subprime lending businesses: Citigroup, Countrywide, GMAC, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, 
Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo. Data from National Mortgage News indicate that all seven of the 
lenders analyzed are among the top 10 national home loan originators, and that five of the seven (all but 
Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase) are among the top 10 national subprime originators.4   
 
The report focuses on these institutions’ lending activities in six metropolitan areas. These areas include 
large urban areas - New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston - as well as the smaller urban areas 
of Charlotte, North Carolina, and Rochester, New York. The areas examined represent communities in 
which the authors of this report and their organizations work.   
 
This report’s analysis focuses on conventional, first lien home purchase loans to owner occupied, site 
build single-family homes. This type of loan provides most American families with their first opportunity 
to accumulate assets and build wealth.5 
 
The analysis reveals that African American and Latino borrowers are more likely to pay more for their 
home loans than white borrowers in each metropolitan area examined and for each lender examined.  
 
The rest of the report is organized as follows. The first section looks at the overall racial and ethnic 
disparities in higher-cost lending for the six metropolitan areas. The second section focuses on the 
disparities found for each lender group in each metropolitan area. The third section presents a case study 
of Washington Mutual, looking at a specific lender group to illustrate concerns about an institution’s 
propensity to fund loans to minority borrowers through its higher-cost subprime channel. The fourth 
section provides further analysis and discussion. Finally, the report offers conclusions and 
recommendations.  
 
 
I. Higher-Cost Lending in Six Metropolitan Areas 
 
Table 1 provides summary information on differences in higher-cost lending levels by race/ethnicity for 
all lenders active in each of the metropolitan areas examined. It shows that the percentage of home 
purchase loans that were higher-cost ranges from a high of 34.7 in Los Angeles to a low of 15.7 percent in 
Rochester. Chicago had the highest share of higher-cost loans to African American borrowers at 64.2 
percent. Boston had the highest share of higher-cost loans to Latino borrowers at 54.5 percent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 “Top Originators in Q3 06” and “Top Subprime Originators in Q3 06.” Database Products Group, National Mortgage News, as found at: 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/mortgagestats/demos/qdr/ on 2/8/07. 
 
5For a full description of the methodology used in this report, see the Appendix. 
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Table 1.  Comparison of Disparities in Higher-Cost Home Purchase Lending 
by Metropolitan Area, 2005 
 
Total African
MSA Loans All White American Latino AA/W Ratio L/W Ratio
Boston 59,456 18.3% 12.5% 54.6% 54.5% 4.4 4.4
Charlotte 48,373 16.2% 11.1% 31.8% 25.7% 2.9 2.3
Chicago 157,880 26.9% 15.3% 64.2% 48.7% 4.2 3.2
Los Angeles 112,918 34.7% 15.8% 53.7% 52.4% 3.4 3.3
New York 58,831 20.2% 9.4% 47.7% 35.8% 5.1 3.8
Rochester 10,675 15.7% 13.7% 44.4% 28.5% 3.2 2.1
Higher Cost Share
 
 
In all markets, African American and Latino borrowers received higher-cost loans at a much greater rate 
than white borrowers. Ratios comparing the percent of home purchase loans that were higher-cost to 
African American borrowers versus white borrowers show that New York had the highest level of 
disparity with African American borrowers being over five times more likely to receive higher-cost home 
purchase loans than white borrowers. Charlotte had the lowest level of African American/white disparity 
among the areas examined, but African American borrowers were still nearly three times more likely to 
get higher-cost loans than white borrowers. In Boston, Latino borrowers were 4.4 times more likely to 
receive higher-cost home purchase loans than white borrowers. Rochester had the lowest disparity ratio 
between Latino and white borrowers, but Latinos were still over twice as likely to receive higher-cost 
home purchase loans as white borrowers.   
 
 
II. Lender Results in Six Metropolitan Areas 
 
Tables 2 and 3 examine specific lender group performance in each metropolitan area analyzed, and Chart 
1 illustrates the weighted average African American/white and Latino/white disparity ratios for all the 
metro areas combined. Wells Fargo had the highest weighted African American/white disparity ratio 
when combining lending in all metro areas.6 For all areas analyzed, Wells Fargo’s African American 
home purchase loan borrowers were ten times more likely to get a higher-cost home loan than whites. 
Wells saw very high African American/white disparity ratios in several survey cities, including Chicago 
(14.3), Los Angeles (11.2), New York (9.1), and Boston (9.1).  
 
HSBC exhibited the largest weighted Latino/white disparity ratio, with HSBC being nearly four times as 
likely to originate higher-cost home purchase loans to Latino borrowers as to white borrowers in all six 
cities combined. HSBC’s Latino borrowers in New York were twelve times as likely as HSBC’s white 
borrowers to have a higher-cost home purchase loan. JP Morgan Chase had the largest Latino/white 
disparity ratio in any one city, with Chase’s Latino borrowers in Los Angeles over fourteen times as likely 
to receive higher-cost home purchase loans as white borrowers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6The weighted average combines the lending of all six metro areas, and will reflect the lending patterns of the larger cities more than those 
of the smaller geographies. 
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Table 2.  African American/White Home Purchase Lending Disparity Ratios by Lender 
Group and Metropolitan Area, 2005 
 
Weighted
Lender Group Boston Charlotte Chicago Los Angeles New York Rochester Average
Citigroup 0.0 5.0 4.2 7.9 5.6 1.8 5.0
Countrywide 3.1 2.9 5.6 5.9 5.3 3.3 4.9
GMAC 3.2 3.4 8.8 2.8 17.2 6.3 5.8
HSBC 3.1 5.6 1.6 2.1 8.8 3.4 3.0
JP Morgan Chase 3.7 2.2 4.0 5.7 5.7 4.7 3.5
Washington Mutual 4.4 1.3 3.3 5.9 9.8 1.0 4.0
Wells Fargo 9.1 5.4 14.3 11.2 9.1 4.5 10.0
Seven Lenders Combined 5.7 4.9 5.7 6.8 12.5 3.3 6.0
All Lenders 4.4 2.9 4.2 3.4 5.1 3.2 3.8  
 
 
 
Table 3.  Latino/White Home Purchase Lending Disparity Ratios by Lender Group and 
Metropolitan Area, 2005 
 
Weighted
Lender Group Boston Charlotte Chicago Los Angeles New York Rochester Average
Citigroup 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.9 2.4 3.2 1.8
Countrywide 1.5 1.7 2.5 5.7 1.9 1.9 2.9
GMAC 1.2 4.5 4.2 1.8 13.8 6.3 2.4
HSBC 3.1 0.0 1.5 2.1 12.2 2.0 3.8
JP Morgan Chase 7.7 5.0 2.3 14.2 3.0 2.3 3.5
Washington Mutual 4.7 1.3 2.9 5.5 8.7 2.0 3.5
Wells Fargo 3.7 2.4 5.2 7.9 5.3 2.4 3.3
Seven Lenders Combined 5.0 3.1 4.1 6.9 7.8 2.6 4.8
All Lenders 4.4 2.3 3.2 3.3 3.8 2.1 3.6  
 
 
Combining home purchase loans by all lender groups in each metro area, New York saw the largest 
African American/white disparities, with African American New Yorkers over 12 times as likely to get a 
higher-cost home purchase loan from the seven lender groups analyzed than whites. Similarly, New 
York’s Latino borrowers were most likely to be stuck with higher-cost home purchase loans from the 
seven lender groups analyzed, with Latinos there nearly eight times as likely to get higher-cost home 
loans as whites.  
 
Importantly, in each metropolitan area, the seven lenders combined showed larger African 
American/white and Latino/white disparities than those exhibited for the lending market as a whole. 
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Chart 1.  Comparison of Weighted Average African American/White and Latino/White  
Disparity Ratios in all Metropolitan Areas, 2005 
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III. A Case Study: Washington Mutual 
 
These findings raise concerns that the largest lenders that offer both prime and subprime products are not 
adequately serving the prime lending needs of minority households. The use of different lending channels, 
whereby a corporation offers prime credit under one name in some locations, and offers higher-cost 
subprime credit under a different name in other locations, enables the corporation to target minority 
neighborhoods with higher-cost subprime loan products. This can be, and is done both through networks 
of branch offices and through networks of mortgage brokers.  
 
The Federal Reserve has noted that much of the disparity in loan pricing by race and ethnicity can be 
explained by the fact that borrowers of color are more likely to obtain their loans from higher-cost 
subprime lenders.7 This suggests that which door a borrower enters--prime or subprime--has a large 
impact on the price that the borrower will pay. This report illustrates this pattern with a case study of one 
corporation which has distinct prime and subprime lending channels: Washington Mutual, Inc. 
 
Washington Mutual is a large bank holding company with over $350 billion in assets. It operates bank 
and thrift affiliates that specialize in prime lending and also owns Long Beach Mortgage Company, one 
of the nation’s largest subprime lenders. As of the third quarter of 2006, Washington Mutual was the third 
ranked mortgage originator in the country and the ninth ranked subprime originator in the country.8 The 
holding company lends through distinct prime and subprime channels. In almost all of the markets 
                                                 
7Avery, Robert B., and Canner, Glenn B. Summer 2005.  “New Information Higher-Cost Loans Under HMDA and Its Application in Fair 
Lending Enforcement.”  Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
 
8Source National Mortgage News 
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analyzed in this report, over 90 percent of the home purchase loans originated by Long Beach Mortgage 
were higher-cost. In contrast, less than one percent of the mortgages originated by Washington Mutual 
Bank were higher-cost.          
 
Lending patterns within Washington Mutual indicate that the lending of higher-cost subprime Long 
Beach Mortgage is heavily targeted to minority borrowers. Chart 2 illustrates this in five of the 
metropolitan areas analyzed. Rochester was omitted from this analysis as Washington Mutual originated 
only 22 loans there.  
 
In Charlotte, 95 percent of the Washington Mutual loans to African American borrowers and 91 percent 
of the loans to Latino borrowers were through Long Beach Mortgage Company compared to 65 percent 
for white borrowers. In Boston, Charlotte, and Chicago, 80 percent or more of the Washington Mutual 
home purchase loans to African American or Latino borrowers were through Long Beach. In New York 
City, less than six percent of Washington Mutual home purchase loans to whites were through Long 
Beach compared to over 51 percent for African American borrowers and over 47 percent for Latino 
borrowers. Similar patterns were seen in Los Angeles.9 
 
 
Chart 2. Percent of Washington Mutual Home Purchase Loans Originated by Long Beach 
Mortgage by Race/Ethnicity and Metropolitan Area, 2005 
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In each city, African American and Latino borrowers utilized Long Beach Mortgage far more frequently 
than did white borrowers. These patterns raise questions about the lending channels used by Washington 
Mutual to reach African American and Latino borrowers and how well Washington Mutual serves the 
prime lending needs of these borrowers.   
 
 
 
                                                 
9Appendix 3 includes maps from illustrating the disparate lending patterns of Long Beach Mortgage and Washington Mutual Bank in New 
York City. 
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IV. Discussion 
 
There has been considerable debate as to why the pricing disparities described above persist. A Federal 
Reserve analysis of HMDA data found that despite controlling for publicly available borrower and lender 
related factors that may affect pricing, a substantial, unexplained gap remained between levels of higher-
cost lending to African American and Latino borrowers and white borrowers.10 This gulf has often been 
attributed to differences in credit history, loan documentation, and overall wealth between race and ethnic 
groups.   
 
Yet evidence suggests that weak borrower credit profiles do not fully explain why some borrowers get 
stuck with higher-cost home loans. The Government Sponsored Enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, have estimated that many subprime borrowers could have qualified for lower-cost prime loans. 
Recent public enforcement actions by state Attorneys General have alleged that certain large national 
subprime lenders were inappropriately charging borrowers more than their credit profiles warranted. 
Additionally, research by consumer groups have used private credit scoring data to show that loan pricing 
disparities remain even after controlling for differences in credit scores.11 Finally, consumer advocates 
continue to request that credit score information be made publicly available, while industry groups 
continue to vehemently resist such disclosure. The lack of such public data makes it impossible to verify 
industry claims that the large disparities in levels subprime lending by race found in this and other reports 
are not discriminatory.  
 
The absence of substantial competition from prime lending institutions in many minority markets is a 
contributing factor to the relative dearth of low-cost credit in these communities. Many communities with 
concentrations of higher-cost loans have few bank branches.  In addition, many households in these 
communities have not historically had positive experiences working with regulated, depository financial 
institutions. This dynamic leaves a vacuum for credit that is often filled by relatively unregulated 
mortgage brokers.  Limited regulatory oversight of the broker industry has led to continued concerns that 
borrowers are often steered into more expensive and less appropriate mortgage products than that for 
which they otherwise might qualify.     
 
Further, many of the corporations that offer both prime and subprime loans do not offer effective “refer 
up” mechanisms that give borrowers with good credit profiles the opportunity to get a lower-cost prime 
loan, even if they are working with the company’s subprime affiliate. A recent agreement between the 
State of New York and Countrywide Financial Corp. requires Countrywide to provide increased 
disclosures on certain products and closely monitor pricing decisions. The agreement was triggered by an 
analysis of 2004 HMDA data by the New York Attorney General’s office which indicated that African 
American and Latino borrowers paid more for loans than white borrowers.12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10See for example Avery, Robert et al. al.  September 2006.  “Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data.”  Federal Reserve 
Bulletin.  
 
11See, Treskon, Mark, Kornil, Milena, Silver, Josh. November 2003.  “Broken Credit System: Discrimination and Unequal Access to 
Affordable Loans by Race and Age.” National Community Reinvestment Coalition; Bocian, Debbie; Ernst, Keith; Li, Wei. May 2006. “Unfair 
Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages,” Center for Responsible Lending. 
 
12Berry, Kate.  December 6, 2006.  “Countrywide-Spitzer Deal a Disclosure Precedent?” American Banker. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The mortgage market is not operating efficiently or fairly if some borrowers are charged more than they 
should be, as when lenders and brokers sell higher-priced subprime loans to borrowers who actually 
qualify for lower-cost prime loans. This dynamic is particularly offensive and egregious if such 
overcharging has a disproportionate effect on people and neighborhoods of color. It is more problematic 
still when a corporation that charges borrowers of color more than they deserve to pay, is a corporation 
that also offers lower-cost prime loans. 
 
The above analysis reveals that many of the largest lenders with both prime and subprime lending 
operations have substantial disparities between their levels of higher-cost lending to African American 
and Latino borrowers and white borrowers. Such patterns indicate a dual lending market in which lenders 
heavily push their higher-cost subprime products to minority markets while excluding those markets from 
access to lower cost prime mortgage products. This is illustrated through the example of Washington 
Mutual, a major lender that operates distinct prime and subprime lending channels, yet sees the vast 
majority of its loans to African American and Latino borrowers come through its subprime unit.    
 
Based on the preceding findings and analysis, we offer the following recommendations in order to combat 
discriminatory lending and unequal access to fairly priced credit: 
 
Regulators - Rigorously examine large bank holding companies for fair lending violations around 
mortgage pricing.  For holding companies that operate lending affiliates regulated by different federal and 
state agencies, conduct coordinated exams that consider the affiliate product mix, marketing efforts, 
delivery channels, and pricing decisions of all lending entities. To date, a state regulator, New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, has taken the only public enforcement action against a mortgage lender 
based on HMDA disparities, despite the Federal Reserve Board having identified hundreds of lenders 
whose data show large differences between the prices paid by racial and ethnic groups and whites.   
 
Securities Industry - Develop screens that filter out predatory loans - including loans where borrowers of 
color are steered to higher-cost loan products or otherwise overcharged - from pools of mortgages that are 
purchased on the secondary market and sold to investors. Wall Street firms and investors buy the 
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations that free up subprime lenders to make 
more loans.  If Wall Street will buy it, subprime lenders will sell it. Currently, there are insufficient due 
diligence procedures and other safeguards in place to ensure that Wall Street is only purchasing fairly 
priced loans. Wall Street firms should turn off the spigot of overpriced credit. 
 
Legislators - Promote and enforce anti-steering legislation that prohibits lenders from putting borrowers 
into higher-cost products when they qualify for lower cost alternatives. Protect borrowers from yield 
spread premiums that reward brokers for acting against the interest of borrowers by charging them higher 
rates than that for which they qualify. 
 
Lenders - Make the same array of prime and subprime products available to all borrowers regardless of 
the delivery channel or lending affiliate the borrower first comes in contact with. Utilize diverse delivery 
mechanisms to ensure that borrowers in communities isolated from mainstream financial institutions have 
access to prime mortgage products.  
 
Federal Reserve Board - Increase the transparency in mortgage pricing by providing additional data 
fields in the HMDA data. These fields should include information on whether or not a loan was originated 
through a broker; borrower credit score; age of borrower; term of mortgage; whether the rate is fixed or 
adjustable; whether a loan is non-traditional (i.e., option ARM, interest-only, hybrid ARM); level of 
income documentation; debt to income ratios; and loan to value ratios. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Part I:  Notes on Data and Definitions  
 
HMDA Data: The primary data source for this report is the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Loan Application 
Register data (HMDA data), as collected, processed, and released each year by the federal government. (For more 
information, visit: www.ffiec.gov/hmda). Among the HMDA data provided for each loan are: the identity of the 
lending institution; whether the loan is government-backed (by the VA or FHA) or “conventional” (not government-
backed); whether or not the home is owner-occupied; whether the home is a site-built home or a manufactured 
home; the census tract, county, and metropolitan area in which the property is located; the race and ethnicity of the 
borrower; the purpose of the loan (home-purchase, refinancing of existing mortgage, or home improvement); the 
lien status of the loan (first lien or junior lien); and pricing information for loans with annual percentage rates above 
threshold levels (see below). The FFIEC makes raw HMDA Loan Application Register data available on CD-ROM.   
Loans Included: This report examines only a particular portion of all loans included in HMDA data – those that are 
(1) for a home purchase (rather than for refinancing an existing mortgage); (2) conventional (rather than 
government-backed); (3) first-lien; (4) for a home that will be occupied by the borrower; and (5) for a site-built 
home.   
Higher-Cost Loans: The specific focus of this report is on investigating what share of all loans by particular lenders 
and to particular groups of borrowers are higher-cost loans.  Beginning with 2004 data, lenders are now required to 
compare the annual percentage rate (APR) on each loan made to the current interest rate on U.S. Treasury securities 
of the same maturity. If the difference (“spread”) between the loan’s APR and the interest rate on the Treasury 
securities is three percentage points or more (for a first-lien loan), then the spread for that loan must be reported in 
the lender’s HMDA data. In this report, loans for which the spreads are reported are referred to as “higher-cost 
loans.” Many people use the terms “subprime loans” and “higher-cost” loans interchangeably, although there are 
many subprime loans (subprime because their interest rates and/or fees are greater than those of prime loans) with 
APRs that are below the HMDA-reporting threshold used to identify “higher-cost” loans. In the tables in this 
Appendix, the acronym “HALs” is used as shorthand for “high-APR loans.”    
Race/Ethnicity: Beginning with 2004, HMDA data classify each borrower and co-borrower by both ethnicity (Latino 
or Not Latino) and race (the possible races are now: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, African American, 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and White) and each person can choose as many races as he or she 
wishes (up to all five). This report classifies borrowers on the basis of the ethnicity and first race of the borrower – 
that is, information about second or additional races of the borrower is ignored, as is all information about the co-
borrower, if any. This report uses three racial/ethnic categories: “Latino” includes all applicants with Latino 
ethnicity, regardless of race; “African American” is shorthand for non-Latino African American; and “white” is 
shorthand for non-Latino white. For the U.S. census and for HMDA data, the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” are 
equivalent, as are the terms “African American” and “African American.”   
 
Lenders: For this report, we chose seven large lending companies that made substantial volumes of both prime and 
subprime loans in 2005. Each of these companies had a corporate “family” of at least two separate lenders that 
reported their own HMDA data. The body of the report includes only data at the corporate level – that is, the loans 
by all of the members each corporate lending family are combined. The tables in this Appendix provide information 
on each individual lender within each of the seven lending families. Table A-1, for all six cities combined, includes 
data for every individual lender that made one or more loans in any of the six cities covered in the report.  Table A-
2, with separate panels for each individual city, includes only individual lenders that accounted for at least 10 
percent of the lending family’s loans in that city and that made at least 25 loans in the city.   
 
Cities: Metropolitan areas can be, and are, defined in many different ways for many different purposes. Each of the 
six groups that participated in preparing this report defined its own metropolitan area in the way that it has found to 
be most useful for its own work. The footnotes to Table A-2 provide information on the precise definitions of each 
city or metropolitan area included in this report.  
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Part II:  Detailed Tables 
 
 
Table A-1 
 Racial/Ethnic Disparities in High-APR Home-Purchase Lending: SIX CITIES COMBINED 
Detailed Information for Individual Lenders in Seven Lender Families 
Conventional First-Lien Loans for Owner-Occupied Site-Built Homes Only
All Borrowers Black Latino White Disparity Ratios
Lenders & Lender Families Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans %HALs B/W L/W
CitiBank, FSB 268        0.0% 25 0.0% 26 0.0% 148 0.0% na na 
Citibank, NA 673        0.3% 93 1.1% 73 1.4% 306 0.0% na na 
Citibank, West  3            0.0% 0 na 1 0.0% 1 0.0% na na 
CitiFinancial Mortgage Co. 55          30.9% 9 55.6% 6 16.7% 36 41.7% 1.33     0.40
CitiMortgage, Inc. 10,458   1.2% 630 5.6% 820 2.0% 5,795 0.9% 6.07     2.13
Citigroup, Total 11,457   1.3% 757 5.4% 926 1.9% 6,286 1.1% 5.01     1.80
Countrywide Bank 3,940     0.9% 158 1.9% 722 1.8% 1,959 0.7% 2.86     2.71
Countrywide Home Loans 35,715   16.5% 2,632 44.5% 7,734 26.8% 17,237 9.4% 4.75     2.86
Countrywide Mortgage Ventures 813        6.8% 57 14.0% 73 2.7% 388 4.1% 3.40     0.66     
Countrywide, Total 40,468   14.8% 2,847 41.6% 8,529 24.5% 19,584 8.4% 4.94     2.91
GMAC Bank 3,496     2.5% 124 10.5% 188 2.1% 2,764 2.3% 4.60     0.93
GMAC Mortgage Corp. 2,774     2.1% 146 10.3% 280 2.5% 1,896 1.7% 6.09     1.48
Homecomings Financial Network 912        20.9% 101 40.6% 162 23.5% 474 15.0% 2.71     1.57
Ditech.com, Inc. 4            0.0% 0 na 0 na 0 na na na 
GMAC, Total 7,186     4.7% 371 18.6% 630 7.8% 5,134 3.2% 5.75     2.41
HSBC Bank USA 49          0.0% 34 0.0% 14 0.0% 0 na na na 
HSBC Mortgage Corp. 6,135     0.9% 382 3.4% 374 1.1% 3,357 1.0% 3.46     1.09
HSBC Mortgage Services 8            75.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 5 100.0% 0.00 0.00
Decision One Mortgage 2,206     95.7% 436 96.8% 854 95.8% 706 94.1% 1.03     1.02
HSBC, Total 8,398     25.9% 853 51.0% 1,243 66.1% 4,068 17.3% 2.96     3.83
Chase Manhattan Bank, USA 727        52.3% 90 61.1% 267 47.9% 266 54.9% 1.11     0.87
JPMorgan Chase Bank 17,198   1.5% 836 4.7% 1,371 2.8% 8,903 1.4% 3.35     2.04
JPMorgan Chase , Total 17,925   3.5% 926 10.2% 1,638 10.2% 9,169 2.9% 3.45     3.46
Long Beach Mortgage Co. 9,049     90.8% 2,239 90.2% 3,994 91.7% 2,010 89.4% 1.01     1.03
Washington Mutual Bank 15,770   0.1% 709 0.3% 2,176 0.3% 8,518 0.1% 2.67     3.04
Washington Mutual, Total 24,819   33.2% 2,948 68.6% 6,170 59.5% 10,528 17.1% 4.00     3.47
Wells Fargo Bank 27,278   3.9% 1,426 23.6% 2,068 7.5% 18,167 2.4% 9.84     3.15
Wells Fargo Funding 1,012     0.8% 27 0.0% 52 7.7% 833 0.5% 0.00 16.02
Seven Other Wells Fargo Lenders 69          0.0% 3 na 0 na 61 0.0% na na 
Wells Fargo, Total 28,359   3.8% 1,456 23.1% 2,120 7.5% 19,061 2.3% 10.02   3.28
Subtotal, These Seven Companies 138,612 13.4% 10,158 41.1% 21,256 32.8% 73,830 6.9% 5.96     4.75
Total, All Lenders 448,133  25.4% 42,853 52.2% 80,039 48.7% 234,879 13.6% 3.82     3.57
   #  This table includes all individual lenders that made at least one loan in any of the six cities.  Table A-2, which has panels for each individual city,
       shows only those individual lenders who accounted for more than 10.0% of a lending family's total loans in a city and who made at least 25 total
       loans in the city.   
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Table A-2 (page 1 of 3)
 Racial/Ethnic Disparities in High-APR Home-Purchase Lending in Individual Cities 
Detailed Information for Individual Lenders in Seven Lender Families 
Conventional First-Lien Loans for Owner-Occupied Site-Built Homes Only
  A. Boston *
All Borrowers Black Latino White Disparity Ratios
Lenders# & Lender Families Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans %HALs B/W L/W
CitiMortgage, Inc. 837        1.3% 13 0.0% 17 0.0% 649 1.2% 0.00 0.00
Citigroup, Total 890        1.2% 13          0.0% 17          0.0% 689        1.2% 0.00 0.00
Countrywide Home Loans 4,255     11.8% 241 30.7% 344 15.4% 2,690 10.0% 3.08 1.55
Countrywide, Total 4,587     11.2% 257        28.8% 367        14.4% 2,935     9.4% 3.06 1.54
GMAC Bank 1,014     2.4% 36 5.6% 17 0.0% 809 2.3% 2.37 0.00
GMAC Mortgage Corp. 800        1.0% 9 11.1% 29 0.0% 682 1.0% 10.83 0.00
Homecomings Financial Network 207        13.5% 7 28.6% 8 25.0% 182 13.2% 2.17 1.90
GMAC, Total 2,025     3.0% 52 9.6% 54 3.7% 1,673 3.0% 3.22 1.24
HSBC Mortgage Corp. 379        1.6% 16 12.5% 9 11.1% 285 1.1% 11.88 10.56
Decision One Mortgage 248        93.1% 64 93.8% 58 89.7% 101 93.1% 1.01 0.96
HSBC, Total 627        37.8% 80 77.5% 67 79.1% 386 25.1% 3.08 3.15
JPMorgan Chase Bank 1,065     2.1% 17 11.8% 16 0.0% 572 2.8% 4.21 0.00
JPMorgan Chase , Total 1,121     4.8% 19 15.8% 37 32.4% 590 4.2% 3.73 7.65
Long Beach Mortgage Co. 626        96.3% 105 94.3% 235 97.0% 247 96.8% 0.97 1.00
Washington Mutual Bank 1,422     0.1% 27 3.7% 50 0.0% 1,157 0.1% 42.85 0.00
Washington Mutual, Total 2,048     29.5% 132 75.8% 285 80.0% 1,404 17.1% 4.43 4.68
Wells Fargo Bank 3,773     2.8% 80 20.0% 181 8.3% 2,736 2.2% 9.12 3.78
Wells Fargo, Total 3,805     2.8% 80 20.0% 182 8.2% 2,762 2.2% 9.06 3.73
Subtotal, These Seven Companies 15,103   10.5% 633 41.1% 1,009 36.0% 10,439 7.3% 5.66 4.96
Total, All Lenders 59,456   18.3% 3,374 54.6% 4,681 54.5% 42,114 12.5% 4.38 4.37
   B. Charlotte *
All Borrowers Black Latino White Disparity Ratios
Lenders & Lender Families Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans %HALs B/W L/W
CitiFinancial Mortgage Co. 27 18.5% 4 100.0% 1 0.0% 18 27.8% 3.60 0.00
Citigroup, Total 35 14.3% 4 100.0% 1 0.0% 25 20.0% 5.00 0.00
Countrywide Home Loans 2,697 13.2% 397 27.0% 121 18.2% 1,631 9.7% 2.78 1.88
Countrywide, Total 3,039 12.6% 440 25.9% 146 15.1% 1,816 8.9% 2.90 1.69
GMAC Bank 261 4.2% 15 20.0% 9 22.2% 214 2.8% 7.13 7.93
GMAC Mortgage Corp. 427 1.2% 40 0.0% 9 11.1% 310 1.3% 0.00 8.61
Homecomings Financial Network 130 29.2% 21 38.1% 3 33.3% 90 17.8% 2.14 1.88
GMAC, Total 818 6.6% 76 14.5% 21 19.0% 614 4.2% 3.42 4.50
HSBC Mortgage Corp. 367 2.7% 23 8.7% 15 0.0% 259 1.5% 5.63 0.00
HSBC, Total 367 2.7% 23 8.7% 15 0.0% 259 1.5% 5.63 0.00
JPMorgan Chase Bank 1,029 2.0% 64 3.1% 67 7.5% 753 1.5% 2.14 5.11
JPMorgan Chase , Total 1,074 3.6% 75 5.3% 73 12.3% 775 2.5% 2.18 5.03
Long Beach Mortgage Co. 467 60.2% 252 59.1% 51 62.7% 122 66.4% 0.89 0.95
Washington Mutual Bank 124 0.0% 14 0.0% 5 0.0% 67 0.0% na na 
Washington Mutual, Total 591 47.5% 266 56.0% 56 57.1% 189 42.9% 1.31 1.33
Wells Fargo Bank 3,233 4.7% 237 16.0% 80 7.5% 2,568 3.0% 5.28 2.47
Wells Fargo, Total 3,477 4.4% 247 15.4% 89 6.7% 2,776 2.8% 5.41 2.37
Subtotal, These Seven Companies 9,401     9.9% 1,131 28.5% 401 18.2% 6,454 5.8% 4.89 3.12
Total, All Lenders 48,373   16.2% 8,069 31.8% 2,681 25.7% 30,241 11.1% 2.86 2.32
    * In this report, "Boston" is the Boston metro area consisting of Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk Counties.  This is the
       same area as the Massachusetts portion of the Boston Metropolitican Statistical Area defined by the federal government in 2003.   
      "Charlotte" is the Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord NC-SC Metropolitan Statistical Area as defined by the federal government in 2003.
       This area consists of five counties in NC (Anson, Cabarrus, Gaston, Mecklenburg, & Union) plus York County in SC.
   #  Individual lenders are shown only if they made at least 25 loans and accounted at least 10% of their  lending family's total loans in this city.  
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Table A-2 (page 2 of 3)
 Racial/Ethnic Disparities in High-APR Home-Purchase Lending in Individual Cities 
Detailed Information for Individual Lenders in Seven Lender Families 
Conventional First-Lien Loans for Owner-Occupied Site-Built Homes Only
  C.  Chicago *
All Borrowers Black Latino White Disparity Ratios
Lenders# & Lender Families Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans %HALs B/W L/W
CitiMortgage, Inc. 2,458     2.7% 242 8.7% 243 4.1% 1,457 1.8% 4.86 2.31
Citigroup, Total 2,674     2.6% 267 7.9% 271 3.7% 1,565 1.9% 4.24 1.99
Countrywide Home Loans 11,976   19.6% 1,107 60.8% 2,490 27.1% 6,589 11.5% 5.27 2.35
Countrywide, Total 13,043   18.2% 1,140 59.2% 2,630 26.0% 7,304 10.6% 5.59 2.46
GMAC Bank 1,944     2.6% 60 13.3% 99 2.0% 1,610 2.2% 6.13 0.93
GMAC Mortgage Corp. 723        3.3% 54 18.5% 63 3.2% 518 2.1% 8.72 1.49
GMAC, Total 2,960     5.5% 160 26.9% 225 12.9% 2,235 3.0% 8.83 4.24
HSBC Mortgage Corp. 404        0.7% 8 12.5% 19 0.0% 281 0.7% 17.56 0.00
Decision One Mortgage 1,119     96.5% 293 96.9% 346 95.7% 425 96.7% 1.00 0.99
HSBC, Total 1,530     71.2% 301 94.7% 366 90.4% 711 58.8% 1.61 1.54
JPMorgan Chase Bank 4,949     1.4% 242 2.9% 580 2.8% 3,327 1.2% 2.47 2.35
JPMorgan Chase , Total 5,319     5.8% 305 18.0% 653 10.3% 3,529 4.6% 3.95 2.25
Long Beach Mortgage Co. 4,989     91.7% 1,355 94.5% 2,111 90.4% 1,295 90.3% 1.05 1.00
Washington Mutual Bank 4,808     0.3% 186 0.5% 437 1.4% 3,302 0.2% 2.54 6.48
Washington Mutual, Total 9,797     46.8% 1,541 83.1% 2,548 75.2% 4,597 25.6% 3.25 2.94
Wells Fargo Bank 8,650     6.2% 662 36.3% 575 13.0% 6,337 2.7% 13.51 4.86
Wells Fargo, Total 9,411     5.8% 679 35.3% 613 12.7% 6,975 2.5% 14.33 5.16
Subtotal, These Seven Companies 44,734   20.4% 4,393 59.2% 7,306 42.6% 26,916 10.4% 5.70 4.10
Total, All Lenders 157,880  26.9% 15,968 64.2% 26,258 48.7% 95,272 15.3% 4.20 3.18
  D.  Los Angeles *
All Borrowers Black Latino White Disparity Ratios
Lenders# & Lender Families Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans %HALs B/W L/W
CitiMortgage, Inc. 1,693     0.4% 40 2.5% 107 0.9% 634 0.3% 7.93       2.96
Citigroup, Total 1,697     0.4% 40 2.5% 109 0.9% 635 0.3% 7.94       2.91
Countrywide Bank 2,470     0.2% 79 1.3% 535 0.7% 974 0.0% na na 
Countrywide Home Loans 13,704   16.0% 522 32.2% 4,244 29.2% 4,800 5.5% 5.87       5.34
Countrywide, Total 16,479   13.4% 631 26.9% 4,821 25.9% 5,858 4.6% 5.91       5.68
GMAC Bank 217        0.0% 9 0.0% 57 0.0% 93 0.0% na na 
GMAC Mortgage Corp. 547        0.2% 24 4.2% 164 0.0% 230 0.0% na na 
Homecomings Financial Network 226        9.3% 15 6.7% 82 9.8% 86 7.0% 0.96       1.40
GMAC, Total 990        2.2% 48 4.2% 303 2.6% 409 1.5% 2.84       1.80
HSBC Mortgage Corp. 426        0.5% 9 0.0% 40 0.0% 133 0.8% -        0.00
Decision One Mortgage 765        95.8% 69 100.0% 446 96.6% 124 87.9% 1.14       1.10
HSBC, Total 1,191     61.7% 78 88.5% 486 88.7% 257 42.8% 2.07       2.07
JPMorgan Chase Bank 2,348     0.4% 46 0.0% 210 0.5% 837 0.4% -        1.33
JPMorgan Chase , Total 2,604     3.9% 60 6.7% 377 16.4% 861 1.2% 5.74       14.16
Long Beach Mortgage Co. 2,079     93.6% 188 92.6% 1,337 94.2% 236 89.8% 1.03       1.05
Washington Mutual Bank 5,892     0.0% 159 0.0% 1,398 0.1% 2,269 0.0% na na 
Washington Mutual, Total 7,971     24.4% 347 50.1% 2,735 46.1% 2,505 8.5% 5.93       5.45
Wells Fargo Bank 6,180     1.7% 181 7.2% 874 4.9% 3,121 0.6% 11.21     7.68
Wells Fargo, Total 6,198     1.7% 181 7.2% 875 5.0% 3,130 0.6% 11.24     7.87
Subtotal, These Seven Companies 37,130   13.8% 1,385 31.3% 9,706 31.5% 13,655 4.6% 6.81       6.85
Total, All Lenders 112,918  34.7% 6,081 53.7% 38,376 52.4% 33,881 15.8% 3.41       3.33
     * In this report, the Chicago metropolitan area is defined here as consisting of six counties: Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will.  The  
       Woodstock Institute views this is the most meaningful definition of metro Chicago, even though it does not correspond to any of the Chicago-area
       metropolitan regions defined by the federal government. 
       "Los Angeles" is defined as the metro area consisting of Los Angeles County.  
   #  Individual lenders are shown only if they made at least 25 loans and accounted at least 10% of their  lending family's total loans in this city.  
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Table A-2 (page 3 of 3)
 Racial/Ethnic Disparities in High-APR Home-Purchase Lending in Individual Cities 
Detailed Information for Individual Lenders in Seven Lender Families 
Conventional First-Lien Loans for Owner-Occupied Site-Built Homes Only
  E.  New York City*  
All Borrowers Black Latino White Disparity Ratios
Lenders# & Lender Families Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans HALs %HALs Loans %HALs B/W L/W
CitiMortgage, Inc. 5,364     0.6% 316 2.5% 451 4 0.9% 2,982 0.4% 5.81       2.03
Citigroup, Total 6,030     0.5% 406 2.2% 523 5 1.0% 3,285 0.4% 5.60       2.42
Countrywide Bank 215        0.0% 14 0.0% 29 0 0.0% 125 0.0% na na 
Countrywide Mortgage Ventures 7            0.0% 0 na 1 0 0.0% 5 0.0% na na 
Countrywide, Total 2,524     15.3% 353 39.1% 546 77 14.1% 970 7.3% 5.34       1.93
GMAC Bank 43          0.0% 4 0.0% 6 0 0.0% 21 0.0% na na 
GMAC Mortgage Corp. 177        3.4% 17 5.9% 13 2 15.4% 84 1.2% 4.94       12.92
GMAC, Total 269        6.3% 32 15.6% 24 3 12.5% 110 0.9% 17.19     13.75
HSBC Bank USA 49          0.0% 34 0.0% 14 0 0.0% 0 na na na 
HSBC Mortgage Corp. 3,218     0.3% 272 1.8% 260 3 1.2% 1,189 0.1% 21.86     13.72
HSBC Mortgage Services 1            0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0 na 0 na na na 
HSBC, Total 3,326     1.9% 324 5.9% 295 24 8.1% 1,199 0.7% 8.79       12.19
JPMorgan Chase Bank 7,575     1.3% 463 5.4% 490 14 2.9% 3,264 0.9% 5.69       3.01
JPMorgan Chase , Total 7,575     1.3% 463 5.4% 490 14 2.9% 3,264 0.9% 5.69       3.01
Long Beach Mortgage Co. 875        91.1% 337 93.8% 259 233 90.0% 102 86.3% 1.09       1.04
Washington Mutual Bank 3,516     0.0% 323 0.0% 286 0 0.0% 1,717 0.1% -        0.00
Washington Mutual, Total 4,391     18.2% 660 47.9% 545 233 42.8% 1,819 4.9% 9.79       8.74
Wells Fargo Funding 25          0.0% 3 0.0% 3 0 0.0% 12 0.0% na na 
Wells Fargo, Total 4,744     1.0% 242 4.5% 339 9 2.7% 2,795 0.5% 9.07       5.30
Subtotal, These Seven Companies 28,859   5.0% 2,480 21.1% 2,762 365 13.2% 13,442 1.7% 12.49     7.83
Total, All Lenders 58,831   20.2% 8,872 47.7% 7,738 2,772 35.8% 24,225 9.4% 5.05       3.79
   F. Rochester, NY *
All Borrowers Black Latino White Disparity Ratios
Lenders & Lender Families Loans %HALs Loans %HALs Loans HALs %HALs Loans %HALs B/W L/W
CitiMortgage, Inc. 106        11.3% 19 26.3% 2 1 50.0% 73 5.5% 4.80       9.13
Citigroup, Total 131        16.0% 27 22.2% 5 2 40.0% 87 12.6% 1.76       3.16
Countrywide Home Loans 781        16.1% 26 46.2% 19 5 26.3% 687 14.1% 3.27       1.86
Countrywide, Total 796        15.8% 26 46.2% 19 5 26.3% 701 13.8% 3.34       1.90
GMAC Mortgage Corp. 100        14.0% 2 100.0% 2 2 100.0% 72 12.5% 8.00       8.00
GMAC, Total 125        17.6% 3 100.0% 3 3 100.0% 94 16.0% 6.27       6.27
HSBC Mortgage Corp. 1,341     1.9% 54 5.6% 31 0 0.0% 1,210 1.8% 3.06       0.00
HSBC, Total 1,414     6.6% 63 19.0% 35 4 11.4% 1,266 5.7% 3.35       2.01
JPMorgan Chase Bank 232        13.8% 4 75.0% 8 3 37.5% 150 16.0% 4.69       2.34
JPMorgan Chase , Total 232        13.8% 4 75.0% 8 3 37.5% 150 16.0% 4.69       2.34
Washington Mutual, Total 21          52.4% 2 50.0% 1 1 100.0% 14 50.0% 1.00       2.00
Wells Fargo Bank 723        17.4% 27 66.7% 22 8 36.4% 622 15.0% 4.46       2.43
Wells Fargo, Total 724        17.4% 27 66.7% 22 8 36.4% 623 14.9% 4.47       2.44
Subtotal, These Seven Companies 3,443     12.5% 152 36.2% 93 26 28.0% 2,935 10.9% 3.33       2.57
Total, All Lenders 10,675   15.7% 489 44.4% 305 87 28.5% 9,146 13.7% 3.24       2.08
   *   New York City consists of the following five counties:  Bronx, Kings (Brooklyn), New York (Manhattan), Queens, and Richmond (Staten Island),
       This report examines lending only in the city, not in the wider metropolitan region.
       "Rochester" is the Rochester NY Metropolitan Statistical Area as defined by the federal government in 2003.  This area consists of five counties:
       Livingston, Monroe, Ontario, Orleans, and Wayne.  
   #  Individual lenders are shown only if they made at least 25 loans and accounted at least 10% of their  lending family's total loans in this city.   
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home purchase loans in New York City in 2005.
Population > 50% Black or Latino
! 1 Dot = 1 Home Purchase Loan Made*
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